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10, Bd. Lahitolle, 18020 Bourges, France
3LAGIS UMR CNRS 8146, Ecole Centrale de Lille,
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Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of secure data transmission based on
multi-input multi-output delayed chaotic systems. A new multi-input se-
cure data transmission scheme is proposed. Moreover, in order to increase
again the robustness of secure data transmission, delays are introduced as
a second firewall against known plain-text attack. With this method, the
parameters used as secret keys of the system are not identifiable and, as
a result, the proposed scheme is robust to known plain-text attacks.
Keywords: Multi-input Multi-output system, Chaos, Observer, Left In-
vertibility Problem, Delays system.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, synchronization of chaotic systems and its potential ap-
plication to secure communications have received a lot of attention since Pecora
and Carrol proposed a method to synchronize two identical chaotic systems
(Pecora et al., 1990). Many chaos-based secure data transmission systems have
been proposed, which can be roughly classified at least into the following cat-
egories: chaotic masking (Kovarev et al., 1992), chaotic masking with delays
(Lee et al., 2003), chaotic switching (Parlitz et al., 1992), chaotic modulation
(Wu et al., 1993) and inverse system approach (Feldmann et al., 1996)....
Since the work (Nijmeijer et al., 1997), synchronization can be viewed as a
special case of observer design problem, i.e the state reconstruction from mea-
surements of an output variable under the assumption that the system structure
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and parameters are known. For a synchronization chaos-based cryptosystem, a
receiver (an observer from a control theory point of view) is designed in order to
synchronize the transmitter (a chaotic system with unknown inputs from a con-
trol theory point of view) and to reconstruct the confidential messages (the un-
known inputs of the chaotic system from a control theory point of view). Many
techniques arising from observation theory have been applied to the problem of
synchronization: observers with linearizable dynamics (Huijberts et al., 2001),
adaptive (Fradkov et al., 2000) or sliding mode observers (Boutat et al., 2001),
generalized hamiltonian form based observers (H. Sira Ramirez and C. Cruz
Hernandez, 2001), etc ...
It is known that some of the designed secure data transmission systems based
on chaos with single input have been broken (Pérez et al., 1995), (Short, 1994),
(Yang et al., 1998), (Anstett et al., 2006). Particularly, it has been recently
shown in (Anstett et al., 2006) that traditional methods of data transmission by
synchronization of chaotic systems suffer from the serious drawback of not being
robust with respect to known plain-text attacks. More precisely, according to
the famous Kerkhoff assumption (Kerkhoff, 1883), it is assumed that hackers
know all the details about the cryptosystem but the secret key. It is known
that, for the chaos-based cryptosystem, the keys are usually the chaotic system
parameters. So from a control theory point of view, the possibility to reconstruct
the keys for chaos-based cryptosystem is equivalent to the possibility to identify
the parameters of the chaotic system (Huijberts et al., 1997). Consequently, a
robust and reliable chaos-based cryptosystem should be designed such that its
parameters are not identifiable.
Although chaotic synchronization using systems with a single input has been
widely investigated in the last decade, it is not the case for the multi-input case.
One of the main reasons is the possibility, for systems with several inputs, to
use multiplexing techniques before ciphering the messages. Thus, the problem
becomes similar to a single input one. Nevertheless, although multiplexing
techniques appear to be a very convenient and economical means, the main
drawback of this kind of scheme is that all the messages have the same risk to
be broken.
In this paper, solutions are provided to improve the secure data transmis-
sion based on chaotic synchronization. First, a real multi-input secure data
transmission is proposed. In this scheme, the inputs are not composed in order
to obtain only one input which ‘drives’ the chaotic system but the totality of
the inputs drive the chaotic system and only the outputs are multiplexed. This
approach decreases the risk of known plain-text attacks, because the probability
to know all plain-texts at the same time is less than to know only one message.
Moreover, the multi-input scheme has the advantage to allow different priorities
of secure data transmission. For example, every user can access to one input
while only the administrator of the group can access to other inputs. Inspired by
the above consideration, a new scheme is derived as follows: for the transmitter
system, the composition is used to combine the outputs, instead of combining
the inputs directly. This approach relies on the problem of designing an observer
for chaotic system (Nijmeijer et al., 1997) but with unknown inputs. Actually,
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Figure 1: Scheme for multiple secure data transmission system
the problem of recovering the message is a left invertibility problem (Hirschorn
R.M., 1979; Singh S.N., 1982; Respondek W., 1990). This scheme can also be
seen as a version for multi-input multi-output systems of the traditional in-
verse system approach proposed in (Feldmann et al., 1996). Fig. 1 illustrates the
scheme of the considered approach. According to this scheme, the inputs can
not always be recovered simultaneously, i.e., even if the message MN1 in Fig. 1,
for example, has been broken, the other ones still remain unbroken. Note that
the users can be divided into several groups according to different requirements
or emergent levels. In that case, different groups (MN1, MN2,..., MNm in Fig.
1) have different degrees of security.
Even if it reduces the risk of the messages to be broken, it will be shown
that this multi-input approach is not robust enough against an attack to known
plain-texts if all the inputs are known at the same time. Indeed, in that case,
the parameters used as secret keys are still identifiable. To solve this problem,
we propose to introduce delays (that will also be considered as a part of the
secret keys) in the outputs of the systems. As a result, the parameters are not
identifiable anymore and classical attacks are inefficient.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section is devoted to the
analysis of the observability and the identifiability of multi-input multi-output
systems without delays. A left inversion algorithm for systems with unknown
inputs, that was introduced in (Barbot et al., 2005), is recalled. Then, crypt-
analysis and identifiability problems are discussed in Section 3 and, in Section
4, a new scheme is given to design a multiple secure data transmission system
with delays based on a given chaotic system, in which the risk for the keys to be
broken by known plain-text attacks can be reduced. In Section 5, an example
based on Qi’s chaotic system (Qi et al., 2005) illustrates the proposed method.
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2 A left invertibility algorithm for systems with-
out delays
In this section, the left invertibility algorithm given in (Barbot et al., 2005) is
recalled.
Consider first a chaotic system without delays in the following general form:
ẋ = f(x) (1)
x ∈ U is the state vector, U is an open set of <n, and f : <n → <n is analytic.
The aim is to establish a multiple secure data transmission system which
can be described by the following form:



ẋ = f (x, k) +
m∑
i=1
gi (x, k)ui
y = [h1 (x) , ..., hp (x)]
T
(2)
where k ∈ <q is the key vector, y ∈ <p is the output vector and u = [u1, . . . , um]T ∈
<m represents the confidential information to be transmitted. The vector fields
f = [f1, . . . , fn]T , g = [g1, . . . , gm] and h = [h1, . . . , hp]T are assumed to be
sufficiently smooth on U , where fi, hj ∈ R and gl ∈ Rn, i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, p],
l ∈ [1,m]. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that, for all x ∈ U , the
distribution span {g1, . . . , gm} and the codistribution span {dh1, . . . , dhp} are
nonsingular. It is also assumed that p ≥ m.
Let us define the following sets that will be used in the sequel:
• The vector relative degree ρ of the system (2) is defined by ρ = {ρ1, ..., ρp},
where ρi = min{s such that LgkLs−1f hi 6= 0 for k = 1 : m}, ∈ [1, p].
• Φ is the codistribution spanned by the time derivatives of the measured
outputs not affected by the inputs:
Φ = span{dh1, ..., dLρ1−1f h1, ..., dhp, ..., dLρp−1f hp}
• Ω is a basis of Φ:
Ω = {dh1, ..., dLr1−1f h1, ..., dhp, ..., dLrp−1f hp}
where r = dim Ω =
p∑
i=1
ri.
£ is the commutative algebra linked to Ω:
£ = span{h1, ..., Lr1−1f h1, ..., hp, ..., Lrp−1f hp} (3)
• Ω£ is the module spanned by Ω over £, and Ω1£ is the submodule spanned
by
{dh1, ..., dLr1−2f h1, ..., dhp, ..., dLrp−2f hp}
over £ where by definition L−1f hj = 0 and L
0
fhj = hj .
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• G is the smallest involutive distribution that contains {g1(x), ..., gm(x)}.
Denote k = dimG, m ≤ k ≤ n.
• G⊥ is the annihilator of G, i.e.
G⊥ = span{α1, ..., αn−k}
where the αi are one-forms such that for all λ ∈ G, lλαi = 0 for i = 1 :
n− k, where lλα = α(λ) is the inner product of the vector field λ and α.
Using the set Ω, one can define a transformation (ξ, η) = φ(x) such that the
system (2) is locally transformed into the following normal form:



ξ̇i1 = ξ
i
2
...
ξ̇iri−1 = ξ
i
ri
ξ̇iri = L
ri
f hi(x) +
m∑
j=1
Lgj L
ri−1
f hi(x)uj
η̇ = p(ξ, η) + q(ξ, η)u
yi = ξi1
(4)
where
ξ =
[ (
ξ1
)T · · · (ξp)T
]T
and
ξi =


ξi1
...
ξiri

 =


hi(x)
...
Lri−1f hi(x)

 , for i ∈ [1, p].
Using classical observation algorithms, the unknown input u can be obtained
(and thus the left invertibility problem can be solved) under some restrictive
conditions: one should have r = n or the distribution span {g1, . . . , gm} should
be involutive. In order to increase the complexity of the unknown message
recovery, it is proposed here to set the unknown input channel such that r <
n and such that span {g1, . . . , gm} is not involutive. In (Barbot et al., 2005),
the authors described an observation algorithm that solves the left invertibility
problem for such systems. It is briefly recalled here. The main idea of this
algorithm is to find extra information through functions of the outputs and
their time derivatives. Let us define:
V =
[
Lr1f h1(x) · · · Lrpf hp(x)
]T
+ Γ(x)u (5)
=
[
y
(r1)
1 · · · y(rp)p
]T
with
Γ(x) =


Lg1L
r1−1
f h1(x) · · · LgmLr1−1f h1(x)
...
. . .
...
Lg1L
rm−1
f hp(x) · · · LgmLrm−1f hp(x)


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that can be known using the normal form (4). Assume there exists a 1×p vector
function K(x) = [k1(x), ..., kp(x)] 6= 0, with ki ∈ £, i = 1, ...p such that
KΓ = 0 (6)
and define a dummy output as follows:
ȳ = h̄(x) = KV =
p∑
i=1
ki(x)Lrif hi(x).
If dȳ /∈ Ω£, it can be considered as a suitable fictitious output in order to
estimate more states. The system has a new vector relative degree r̄ = n with
respect to the original outputs and the fictitious output ȳ. If r̄ = n, it has been
shown in [Barbot, et al., 2005] that both the state x and the unknown inputs u
can be estimated in finite time.
The following proposition gives some equivalent conditions that guarantee
the existence of a solution to Equation (6) and thus, the existence of a proper
dummy output.
Proposition 1 (Barbot et al., 2005) The following conditions are equivalent:
i) Equation (6) has a non trivial solution K and dȳ /∈ Ω£.
ii) the set of equivalence classes E = G
⊥∩Ω£
G⊥∩Ω1£
of elements of G⊥ ∩ Ω£ modulo
G⊥ ∩ Ω1£ is such that E 6= ∅,
iii) Ξ = {α ∈ G⊥ ∩ Ω£ such that lfα /∈ £} 6= ∅.
The dummy outputs ȳ are only function of the previously known outputs
and their time derivatives. If the system is left invertible, the algorithm derived
in (Barbot et al., 2005) provides an expression of all the states and the unknown
inputs as functions of the original outputs y, their time derivatives and the key
vector1: {
x = Ξ
(
y, ẏ, ..., y(n−1), k
)
u = Ψ
(
y, ẏ, ..., y(n−1), k
) (7)
Then, the states and the unknown inputs can be reconstructed in finite time
via for instance sliding mode observers (see (Floquet and Barbot, 2006)).
Consequently, for this scheme, the security of the transmission is partially
based on the difficulty to find all the dummy outputs ȳ. But, when all ȳ are
formally known it is possible to derive equations (7). Then, the main question
is whether or not it is possible from (7) to identify the key k. This point is
discussed in the next section.
1This algebraic point of view was also adopted in (Cannas et al., 2005) and (Sira, 2006)
for the finite time synchronization of some classes of chaotic systems.
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3 Cryptanalysis and identifiability
Equation (7), and consequently the proposed scheme, can not resist to known
plain-texts attack when all plain-texts are known at the same time. Indeed,
consider the second equation of (7) at different instants t1, ..., tl. It is possible
to obtain independent equations with respect to k:



u(t1) = Ψ
(
y(t1), ẏ(t1), ..., y(n−1)(t1), k
)
u(t2) = Ψ
(
y(t2), ẏ(t2), ..., y(n−1)(t2), k
)
...
...
...
u(tl) = Ψ
(
y(tl), ẏ(tl), ..., y(n−1)(tl), k
)
(8)
Then, two cases appear:
• there exist q = l independent equations, which is equivalent to:
rank


∂Ψ(y(t1),ẏ(t1),...,y(n−1)(t1),k)
∂k
∂Ψ(y(t2),ẏ(t2),...,y(n−1)(t2),k)
∂k
...
∂Ψ(y(tq),ẏ(tq),...,y(n−1)(tq),k)
∂k


= q
From the implicit function theorem it is obvious that all parameters are
identifiable. Consequently, such a data transmission scheme is not robust
against known plain-text attacks.
• l < q, which means that q − l parameters are not identifiable and can
not play the role of the key. Thus, the knowledge of these parameters is
not necessary for recovering the message and those parameters are of no
interest in the transmitter design.
The question is how to obtain an input-output relation equation, sensitive to
parameters, but that should be not identifiable even if all the inputs are known.
To solve this problem, it is proposed here to introduce delays (that are also a
part of the unknown parameters) in the secure data transmission system.
Assume for instance that at least one delay appears in (7). Then, (8) be-
comes: 


u(t1) = Ψ(y(t1), ẏ(t1), ..., y(n−1)(t1),
y(t1 − τ), ...., y(j)(t1 − τ), k)
u(t2) = Ψ(y(t2), ẏ(t2), ..., y(n−1)(t2),
y(t2 − τ), ..., y(j)(t2 − τ), k)
...
...
...
u(tl) = Ψ(y(tl), ẏ(tl), ..., y(n−1)(tl),
y(tl − τ), ...., y(j)(tl − τ), k)
(9)
with j ≤ n− 1. From (9), it can be seen that there are more unknown inputs,
y(s)(tz − τ) and k, than the number of independent equations. Consequently,
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the introduction of the delay operator into the input-output relation equation
exhibits a robust characteristics with respect to known plain-text attacks.
In the following section, the robustness of the previously proposed scheme
is improved by the introduction of delays.
4 Secure data transmission scheme based on sys-
tems with delays
Consider the system (2) with delays:
8
<
:
ẋ = f (x, k) +
mP
i=1
gi (x, y(t− τ1), .., y(t− τl), k) ui
y = [h1 (x) , ..., hp (x)]
T
(10)
where the l delays are also a part of the secret key. Let us show that the
algorithm given in (Barbot et al., 2005) still allows to solve the left invertibility
problem and thus to recover the messages ui.
Since the delays only appear in the gi vector fields, it is always possible to
transform such system in the form (4) with delays:
8
>>>>><
>>>>>:
ξ̇i1 = ξ
i
2
...
ξ̇iri−1 = ξ
i
ri
ξ̇iri = L
ri
f hi(x) +
mP
j=1
Lgj L
ri−1
f hi(x)uj
η̇ = p(ξ, η) + q(ξ, η, y(t− τ1), .., y(t− τl))u
yi = ξ
i
1
(11)
where Lgj L
ri−1
f hi is given by:
Lgj L
ri−1
f hi =
∂Lri−1f hi
∂x
gj(x, y(t− τ1), .., y(t− τl), k).
Then Equation (5) becomes
V =
[
Lr1f h1(x) · · · Lrpf hp(x)
]T
+ Γ(x, y(t), y(t− τ1), .., y(t− τl), k)u (12)
=
[
y
(r1)
1 · · · y(rp)p
]T
.
Assume it is possible to find K(x) = [k1(x), ..., kp(x)] 6= 0 with ki ∈ £ such
that
K(x)Γ(x, y(t), y(t− τ1), ..., y(t− τl), k) = 0.
Then, in a similar way to the case without delays, it is possible to recover the
message u in finite time.
As a way of illustration, an example is given in the next section in order to
illustrate all the key points of the proposed method. A sliding mode observer
that provides the knowledge of the confidential information in finite time is also
designed.
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5 Illustrative example
Let us construct a multiple secure data transmission system based on Qi’s
Chaotic System in (Qi et al., 2005), which is described as follows:



ẋ1 = a(x2 − x1) + x2x3x4
ẋ2 = b(x1 + x2)− x1x3x4
ẋ3 = −cx3 + x1x2x4
ẋ4 = −dx4 + x1x2x3
(13)
where xi (i = 1, ..., 4) are the state variables, and a, b, c, d are all positive real
constant parameters. Consider the following transmitter which is based on the
chaotic system (13):



ẋ1 = a(x2 − x1) + x2x3x4
+(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)m1
ẋ2 = b(x1 + x2)− x1x3x4
ẋ3 = −cx3 + x1x2x4 + x3m2
ẋ4 = −dx4 + x1x2x3 − x4m2
(14)
where e is a positive real constant, τ is the introduced delay and, for sake of
notation simplicity, xi stands for xi(t).
Note that g1 =
[
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2) 0 0 0
]T
and g2 =
[
0 0 x3 −x4
]T .
It is assumed that m1 and m2 are small, that 0 < m2 < β and that the following
condition is satisfied:
d− c− β > 0. (15)
The outputs are set as y =
[
x1 x2
]T . The input channel vector fields g1
and g2 have been chosen such that the strong relative degree of the system is
r = 3. So, following the lines of the algorithm proposed in (Barbot et al., 2005),
calculate
Γ =
(
Lg1h1 Lg2h1
Lg1Lfh2 Lg2Lfh2
)
=
(
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2) 0
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)(b− x3x4) 0
)
.
Thus, one can choose
K =
(
b− x3x4, −1
)
such that KΓ = 0. Since K is not a function of the delayed output, it is possible
to use again the algorithm proposed in (Barbot et al., 2005). One has
£ = span{h1, h2, Lfh2}
= span{x1, x2, x3x4}
because
Lfh2 = b(x1 + x2)− x1x3x4 = x3x4mod{x1, x2}
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Then, the following dummy output can be defined as:
ȳ = K
[
Lfh1
L2fh2
]
= (b− x3x4) ẏ1 − ÿ2
=
(
x23 + x
2
4
)
mod£(x)
and dȳ /∈ Ω£. Thus, item i) of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Then, let us set
y ,
[
x1, x2, x
2
3 + x
2
4
]T
.
With this new output y, the dimension of the set
Φ = span{dx1, dx2, dx3x4, d
(
x23 + x
2
4
)}
is equal to 4. This means that one can recover all the state in finite time.
A straightforward consequence of the fact that span{g1, g2} is regular, is the
possibility to reconstruct the unknown messages also in finite time. For this, let
us design a sliding mode observer as follows:



.
x̂1 = a (x2 − x1) + x2x̃3x̃4 + E1λ1sign(x1 − x̂1)
.
x̂2 = b(x1 + x2) + λ2sign(x2 − x̂2)
d(x̂3x̂4)
dt = − (c + d) x̃3x̃4
+E2λ3sign(x̃3x̃4 − x̂3x̂4)
d(x̂23+x̂24)
dt = −2cx̃23 − 2dx̃24 + 4x1x2x̃3x̃4
+2E3λ4sign
((
x̃23 + x̃
2
4
)− (x̂23 + x̂24
))
(16)
with
λi > 0, i = 1, ..., 4
E1 =
{
1 x2 = x̂2
0 otherwise
E2 =
{
1 if E1 = 1 and x1 = x̂1
0 otherwise
E3 =
{
1 if E2 = 1 and x̃3x̃4 = x̂3x̂4
0 otherwise
and with the auxiliary states:
x̃3x̃4 = −λ2sign(x2 − x̂2)
x1
(17)
x̃23 + x̃
2
4 =
E2λ3sign(x̃3x̃4 − x̂3x̂4)
x1x2
. (18)
Observability bifurcations can also introduced in order to improve the ro-
bustness of the transmission scheme. Here, the submanifold of observability
singularity is given by
S = {x1 = 0} ∪ {x1x2 = 0}.
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In order to overcome the singularity, one can use the same method as in (Barbot
et al., 2003).
The following quantities will be used to reconstruct the messages:
m̃1 =
E2λ1sign(x1 − x̂1)
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)
(19)
m̃2 =
E4λ4sign
((
x̃23 + x̃
2
4
)− (x̂23 + x̂24
))
x̃23 − x̃24
. (20)
where
E4 =
{
1 if E3 = 1 and x̃23 + x̃
2
4 = x̂
2
3 + x̂
2
4
0 otherwise
The observation errors are defined by:



e1 = x1 − x̂1
e2 = x2 − x̂2
e34 = x3x4 − x̂3x̂4
e32+42 =
(
x23 + x
2
4
)− (x̂23 + x̂24
)
From system (14), it can be computed that:
d (x3x4)
dt
= − (c + d)x3x4 + x1x2
(
x23 + x
2
4
)
and
d
(
x23 + x
2
4
)
dt
= −2cx23 + 4x1x2x3x4
−2dx24 + 2
(
x23 − x24
)
m2. (21)
Thus, the dynamics of the observation error is given by:



ė1 = x2 (x3x4 − x̃3x̃4) + (1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)m1 − E1λ1sign(e1)
ė2 = −x1x3x4 − λ2sign(e2)
ė34 = − (c + d) (x3x4 − x̃3x̃4) + x1x2
(
x23 + x
2
4
)
−E2λ3sign(x̃3x̃4 − x̂3x̂4)
ė32+42 = −2c
(
x23 − x̃23
)− 2d (x24 − x̃24
)
+4x1x2 (x3x4 − x̃3x̃4) + 2
(
x23 − x24
)
m2
−2E3λ4sign
((
x̃23 + x̃
2
4
)− (x̂23 + x̂24
))
The convergence of the sliding mode observer relies on a step-by-step procedure.
First step: one has:
ė2 = −x1x3x4 − λ2sign(e2).
All the states are bounded. So, one can choose the gain λ2 > sup∀t>0 |−x1x3x4|
so that a sliding motion appears after a finite time t1 on e2 = 0. Writing that
ė2 = 0 gives :
−x1x3x4 = λ2sign(e2).
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Then
x̃3x̃4 = −λ2sign(e2)
x1
= x3x4 (22)
and
E1 = 1. (23)
Second step: for t > t1, using (22) and (23), the e1 dynamics becomes:
ė1 = (1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)m1 − λ1sign(e1).
Thus, if λ1 > sup∀t>0 |m1|, there exists t2, such that, for t > t2 > t1, e1 =
ė1 = 0. Then:
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)m1 − λ1sign(e1) = 0
and
E2 = 1. (24)
The relation (19) provides a finite time estimation of m1.
m̃1 =
E2λ1sign(e1)
(1 + e (x1(t− τ))2)
= m1.
Third step: for t > t2, using (22) and (24), one has:
ė34 = x1x2
(
x23 + x
2
4
)− λ3sign(e34).
If λ3 is chosen such that
λ3 > sup
∀t>0
∣∣x1x2
(
x23 + x
2
4
)∣∣ ,
one obtains after a finite time t3, e34 = ė34 = 0. Thus,
x1x2
(
x23 + x
2
4
)− λ3sign(e34) = 0
and E3 = 1. From the definition of the auxiliary variable (18):
x̃23 + x̃
2
4 =
λ3sign(e34)
x1x2
= x23 + x
2
4.
The possibility to estimate m2 requires the knowledge of x̃23 and x̃
2
4. Define
x̃3x̃4 = A
x̃23 + x̃
2
4 = B
There are two groups of solutions:
S1 :
{
x̃231 =
B+
√
B2−4A2
2
x̃241 =
B−√B2−4A2
2
and
S2 :
{
x̃232 =
B−√B2−4A2
2
x̃242 =
B+
√
B2−4A2
2
(25)
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Suppose that S1 is the correct solution. From (21), the confidential message
can be recovered correctly as follows:
−cx̃231 − dx̃241 +
(
x̃231 − x̃241
)
m21 = −2x1x2x̃3x̃4 , C. (26)
In this case, one has for S2:
−cx̃232 − dx̃242 +
(
x̃232 − x̃242
)
m22 = C. (27)
Using (26) and (27), one has:
m22 =
[ −cx̃231 − dx̃241 +
(
x̃231 − x̃241
)
m21
+cx̃232 + dx̃
2
42
]
(
x̃232 − x̃242
)
Note that x̃231 = x̃
2
42 and x̃
2
32 = x̃
2
41 . So this equation becomes
m22 =
[ −cx̃231 − dx̃241 +
(
x̃231 − x̃241
)
m21
+cx̃241 + dx̃
2
31
]
(
x̃241 − x̃231
)
= c− d−m21
If m21 is the correct solution, then m22 < 0 according to Eq. (15) and this ex-
cludes the solution m22 . Following this way, the correct solution corresponding
to x̃23 and x̃
2
4 can be found.
Fourth step: Since x̃23 and x̃
2
4 have been estimated, one has:
ė32+42 = 2(x23 − x24)m2 − 2E3λ4sign (e32+42) .
Thus, tuning λ4 > sup∀t>0
∣∣(x23 + x24)m2
∣∣ ensures that e32+4 = ė32+42 = 0, after
a finite time t4, and:
(x23 − x24)m2 − λ4sign (e32+42) = 0.
The relation (20) leads to the finite time estimation of the second confidential
message:
m̃2 =
E4λ4sign (e32+42)
x̃23 − x̃24
= m2.
For the simulation, the following values were chosen:



a = 35, b = 10,
c = 1, d = 10,
τ = 3
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the behaviour of the states of the transmitter
and those of the receiver. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the original messages (m1
and m2) and their estimations. Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that the states of
the receiver converge fast to those of the transmitter. It can be seen in Figures
6 and 7 that, once the state is estimated, the confidential messages are well
reconstructed.
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Figure 2: simulation of x1 and its estimate
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Figure 3: simulation of x2 and its estimate
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Figure 4: simulation of x3x4 and its estimate
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Figure 5: simulation of x23 + x
2
4 and its estimate
0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Time (s)
m
1 
an
d 
its
 e
st
im
at
e
Figure 6: simulation of m1 and its estimate
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Figure 7: simulation of m2 and its estimate
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6 Conclusion
In this article, a new multiple secure data transmission system based on multi-
input multi-output chaotic delayed systems was proposed. The multi-input
multi-output scheme allows to reduce the risk for the messages to be broken
because it is more difficult to know all the unknown inputs at the same time.
Some delays were also introduced in order to improve the robustness of the
secure data transmission with respect to known plain-text attacks.
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